Abstract. This paper proposes a blockcipher mode of operation, HCTR, which is a length-preserving encryption mode. HCTR turns an n-bit blockcipher into a tweakable blockcipher that supports arbitrary variable input length which is no less than n bits. The tweak length of HCTR is fixed and can be zero. We prove that HCTR is a strong tweakable pseudorandom permutation ( sprp), when the underlying blockcipher is a strong pseudorandom permutation (sprp). HCTR is shown to be a very efficient mode of operation when some pre-computations are taken into consideration. Arbitrary variable input length brings much flexibility in various application environments. HCTR can be used in disk sector encryption, and other length-preserving encryptions, especially for the message that is not multiple of n bits.
Introduction
Basic encryption modes, such as CBC [27] , increase the message length. But in many scenarios, we need a length-preserving encryption (enciphering). For example, in networking application, some packet format was not defined for cryptographic purposes, and can not be altered. So when we want add privacy features, we can not even lengthen one bit. The other example is disk sector encryption. A disk is partitioned into fixed-length sectors. The sector-level encryption is a low-level encryption. The encryption device knows nothing about the information of files or directories. It encrypts or decrypts sectors when they arrive. Suppose the plaintext at the sector location of T is P , and the encryption algorithm is E, then the ciphertext stored in this sector is C = E In the above example the message length is not always fixed and the same as, but usually much longer than, that of well known blockciphers such as DES (64 bits) or AES (128 bits) [6] . For example the sector length is typically 512 bytes. So we need wide-block-length enciphering modes based on blockciphers. When we have a wide-block-length enciphering mode, we can easily put the tweak into it using the method in [11] or [8] , to get a tweakable enciphering mode.
This paper proposes a tweakable enciphering mode, or an arbitrary-variableinput-length tweakable blockcipher. We name it HCTR, for it makes use of a special universal hash function and the CTR mode. If the underlying blockcipher is E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , then our mode supports arbitrary variable length of at lest n bits, using a (k+n)-bit key and m blockcipher calls to encipher m blocks plaintext. The length of tweak in HCTR is fixed and can be zero. When it is zero, HCTR becomes an enciphering mode, or a arbitrary-variable-inputlength blockcipher.
Our HCTR mode is a hash-encipher-hash construction, part of the middle layer uses the CTR encryption mode. HCTR is similar to the XCB mode [13] , and also can be viewed as a generalization to the basic construction of sprp in [11] . The ABL mode [15] and the XCB mode [13] are unbalanced Feistel constructions using universal hash functions as their components. They also support variable input length, but the secret key is very long (4 keys in ABL and 5 keys in XCB) and have to be generated from a main key. The CMC mode [8] and the EME mode [9] are modes without using any universal hash functions. But they only support the message that is multiple of a block. HCTR has great advantage among these modes.
The attack-model is an adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack: an adversary can choose a tweak T , a plaintext P and get a ciphertext C = E T K (P ); or choose a tweak T , a ciphertext C and get a plaintext P = ( E T K ) −1 (C). The current query can base on previous answers. We prove that HCTR is a strong secure tweakable blockcipher ( sprp), which is defined as the one indistinguishable from the independently random permutations indexed by the tweak T . If HCTR is used in disk sector encryption, the effect is that each sector is encrypted with a different random permutation independently. This kind of tweakable blockcipher is under standardization [19] by the IEEE Security in Storage Working Group. Our proof method adopts the game-play technique [2, 26] , which was first used in [10] .
We give basic definitions in Section 2. Specification of HCTR is in Section 3. Section 4 discusses some insure modifications and compares HCTR with other modes. The concrete security bound is given in Section 5.
Related Work
Constructions of large-block-size blockciphers from small-block-size blockciphers can date back to the pioneering work of Luby and Rackoff [12] . They showed that three rounds of the Feistel structure turns n-bit to n-bit random functions into a 2n-bit secure blockcipher, and four rounds into a strong secure one. Naor and Reingold [18] showed that two rounds Feistel construction with initial and final strong universal invertible hash functions is enough to construct a strong secure blockcipher. In [17] , they further used this hash-encipher-hash construction to get a mode of operation, but the hash function is quiet complex. Patel etc. further discussed the function of universal hash functions in the Feistel construction [20] . Bellare and Rogaway [1] used a special pseudorandom function and a special encryption mode to construct a variable-input-length cipher. Patel etc. [21] made some efficiency improvement to this scheme and the other unbalanced Feistel construction by using universal hash functions.
The constructions of tweakable blockciphers from scratch involve HPC [24] and Mercy [5] (although it has been broken by Fluhrer [7] ).
Tweakable blockcipher is not only a suitable model for disk sector encryption and useful in length-preserving encryption, but also a good starting point to do design problem [11] . Following this thought, Rogaway [22] made refinement to modes OCB [23] and PMAC [3] using tweakable blockciphers.
Basic Definitions
We write s R ← − S to denote choosing a random element s from a set S by uniform distribution. Let Perm(M) be the set of all length-preserving permuta-
n , we denote it as Perm(n). Let Perm T (M) be the set of all mappings from T to Perm(M). Perm T (M) can also be viewed as the set of all blockciphers E :
n , we denote it as Perm T (n). An adversary is a (randomized) algorithm with access to one or more oracles which are written as superscripts. Without loss of generality, we assume that adversaries never ask trivial queries whose answers are already known. For example, an adversary never repeats a query and never asks (
receiving C as an answer to E K (T, M ), and so forth. Let A ρ ⇒ 1 be the event that adversary A with oracle ρ outputs the bit 1.
is sufficiently small for any A with reasonable resources, then E is said to be a pseudorandom tweakable permutation ( prp), or a secure tweakable blockcipher, or secure against chosen plaintext attack. If the advantage function
is sufficiently small for any A with reasonable resources, then E is said to be a strong pseudorandom tweakable permutation ( sprp), or a strong secure tweakable blockcipher, or secure against chosen ciphertext attack.
prp AND sprp. When the tweak space T = φ, the tweakable blockcipher becomes the blockcipher. A blockcipher E :
. prp and sprp correspond to prp and sprp respectively.
Specification of HCTR

Notations
A string is a finite sequence of symbols, each symbol being 0 or 1. A block is a string of fixed length. The blockcipher and multiplication of the finite field are operations over blocks. Let {0, 1} * be the set of all strings. If X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * , then X||Y is their concatenation. If X ∈ {0, 1} * , then the bit-length of X, denoted as |X|, is the number of bits in X. |X| = 0 if and only if X is the empty string ε. If one block is n bits, we can parse X into m = |X|/n blocks: 
Multiplication in GF
If we choose the blockcipher as AES [6] , then the bit-length of a block is 128 bits. The corresponding irreducible polynomial can be chosen as p(x) = 1 + x + x 2 + x 7 + x 128 .
Universal Hash Function
H is a function family:
* , X is padded into complete blocks and then the polynomial evaluation [4] is used. Suppose |X| n = m, we parse X into X = X 1 , · · · , X m . We append 0s, possibly none, at the end of X to complete the block and append |X|, which is written as a n-bit string, as the last block. Then we use polynomial evaluation hash function in h on the padding result. More specifically, H h is defined as:
which can be calculated as following:
When X is empty string, we define that H h (X) = h. H is a special AXU (Almost Xor Universal) hash function. It has following properties which will be used in the security proof of HCTR.
For any
is a nonzero polynomial in h without constant term. So Pr[h
n , where l = max{|X| n , |Y | n } + 1. In other words, H is a l/2 n -AXU hash function.
For any X, Y, Z ∈ {0, 1} * , |X| = |Y |, we have H(X) ⊕ H(Y ) ⊕ H(Z)
is a nonzero polynomial in h without constant term.
The CTR Mode
In HCTR we use a special form of the CTR mode:
where |N | n = m − 1, K is the key and S is the counter.
The HCTR Mode
The HCTR mode makes use of a blockcipher E and the special universal hash function H. Assume that the blockcipher is E : {0, figure 1 . we split the plaintext/ciphertext into two strings. One is the left n bits, and the other is the rest. We assume that plaintext/ciphertext has m blocks. More specifically, HCTR is the following algorithm.
Fig. 1. The HCTR Mode
HCTR[E, H] is illustrated in
Algorithm HCTR
T K,h (M, N) MM ← M ⊕ H h (N ||T ) CC ← EK(MM) S ← MM ⊕ CC D ←CTR S K (N ) C ← CC ⊕ H h (D||T ) return (C, D) Algorithm (HCTR T K,h ) −1 (C, D) CC ← C ⊕ H h (D||T ) MM ← E −1 K (CC) S ← MM ⊕ CC N ←CTR S K (D) M ← MM ⊕ H h (N ||T ) return (M, N)
Discussions
UNIVERSAL HASH FUNCTION. H in HCTR is a special AXU hash function. We can not substitute H by a general AXU hash function. We define a different universal hash function H h (X) base on which HCTR is not secure. The main difference is the padding rule. In the HCTR mode, the padding rule is to append 0s and then the bit-length of X as in H. Now we first append 1 and then 0s to turn the bit-length of X into multiple of n and then use polynomial evaluation hash function. Suppose X = X 1 , · · · , X m where |X| n = m, and
n where l = max{|X| n , |Y | n } + 1.
We now chose the length of tweak as 0: T = φ. In this situation, we can show that HCTR[E, H ] is not even a prp. We first make an arbitrary enciphering
. Now we make the other enciphering query (
. We get the answer (C 2 , D 2 ). Then the input to the second blockcipher in the last but one query is the same as the input to the first blockcipher in the last query. Therefore we have that (
. So we can recover h with successful probability of 1/4 and get rid of the hash function layers. Without the hash function layers, we can easily distinguish HCTR from a random permutation.
LENGTH of TWEAK. The length of tweak is fixed, because in most application environment there is no need for variable length tweak. We can chose the length of tweak according to the practical application environment. If we really need the variable length tweak, we can choose GHASH in [16, 14, 13] which is similar to H and takes two inputs.
MULTIPLICATION. The multiplication in finite field dominates the efficiency of the hash function layers. A simple implement of multiplication is even much slower than one AES call. But notice that the key h is a constant during the enciphering course, therefore we can do some pre-computations before enciphering. This time-memory tradeoffs greatly speeds up the hash function, though a bit more storage is needed. See [16, 25] for specific discussions.
CMC EME ABL XCB HCTR COMPARISONS. We compare HCTR with other enciphering modes, such as CMC, EME, ABL, and XCB, from several aspects. Suppose that we encrypt an message of m blocks. We list the comparisons in the above table. The first is the number of key. The second and third are the invocation number of the blockcipher and universal hash function. The following is whether the mode is parallelizable. In blockciphers, every bit of input bit must effect every bit of output. So there is no full parallelization. Even in the EME mode, the last layer must begin after the first layer is completely finished. In the HCTR mode, the CTR encryption can be parallelizable.
Security of HCTR
We prove that HCTR is a sprp. A concrete security bound for HCTR is given in theorem 1. Lemma 1 shows that the random tweakable permutation and its inverse are indistinguishable from oracles that return random bits. This lemma greatly facilitates the proof procedure of lemma 2 which shows the security of HCTR when E K is replaced by a random permutation.
Lemma 1 (lemma 6 in [8]). Let π
Then for any adversary A that makesueries,
where $(T, M ) returns |M | random bits and N is the bit-length of a shortest string in M.
Let HCTR[Perm(n), H] be a variant of HCTR that uses a random permutation on n bits instead of E K . Specifically, the key generation algorithm returns a random permutation π R ← − Perm(n) and a random string h
n . We first give a concrete security bound for HCTR[Perm(n), H]. 
Lemma 2. Let E = HCTR[Perm(n), H]. Then for any adversary A that asks enciphering/deciphering queries totalling σ blocks,
Pr[A E(·,·),E −1 (·,·) ⇒ 1] − Pr[A $(·,·),$(·,·) ⇒ 1] ≤ ((2 + t 0 )σ 2 + σ 3 )/
